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I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite a long tradition of writing dedicated to the legal history
of Latin America, the field in recent decades has been overshadowed
by a more extensive body of work examining the social and economic
history of the region. For better than a generation, historians of the
region, often aided by interdisciplinary training in the social sciences
or, even, informed by anthropologists, sociologists, and economists
doing historical research on the region, have brought new
understandings of previously underexplored populations, such as
peasants, the industrial proletariat, women as independent actors, and
indigenous and Afro-American populations, among others.1 This
newer historiography has often brought a needed balance to the field, a
correction of the tendency of previous generations of historians to
concentrate on political history and ruling elites, sometimes to the
exclusion of the less powerful and the less visible.2

*
Harold Paul Green Research Professor of Law and Professor of History and
Sociology, The George Washington University. I would like to thank Raymond T. Diamond
for reading an earlier draft of this Essay and for making helpful suggestions.
1.
See, e.g., Alan Knight, Research Report, Subalterns, Signifiers, and Statistics:
Perspectives on Mexican Historiography, LATIN AM. RES. REV., Summer 2002, at 136, 13638 (providing an overview of Latin American historiography).
2.
Id. at 137-48 (advocating Latin-American scholarship that evaluates “paradigms,
schools of thought, and theoretical premises”).
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This change in emphasis is also coming to legal history. Writings
on Latin-American legal history, the functioning of courts, legal
doctrine, and the role of lawyers, have until quite recently been a fairly
traditional field concerned primarily with institutional histories and the
evolution of legal doctrine, largely through the adoption of new
codes.3 The history of law and how that history influenced or failed to
influence social status, politics, family life, relations among different
racial and ethnic groups, and crime and punishment, the kind of legal
historiography that U.S. legal historian Lawrence Friedman called, in
his effort to similarly reorient American legal history, “a social history
of American law” was largely lacking in the writings produced by
historians of Latin America.4
If historians had been relatively slow in the effort to develop a
social history of Latin-American law, legal scholars have also been
slow to explore the possibilities of examining the behavior and
function of law in the past and how the law has helped to shape, and in
turn has been shaped, by the complex social and cultural histories of
the different societies of Latin America.5 There are perhaps many
reasons for this. Certainly the view of many regional specialists that
law is little more than an instrument to maintain elite power and
privilege and, hence, an institution less worthy of study than political
alignments, clientism, or military power has probably contributed to
the relative neglect of the field.6 There has also been, it is fair to say, a
3.
Silvia Marina Arrom, New Directions in Mexican Legal History, 50 AMERICAS
461, 461-65 (1994) (discussing the formulation and implementation of the Mexican legal
system). For two recent examples of historians working in the area of Latin-American legal
history and doing important work in combining the history of law with social history, see
generally 1 LINDA LEWIN, SURPRISE HEIRS: ILLEGITIMACY, PATRIMONIAL RIGHTS, AND LEGAL
NATIONALISM IN LUSO-BRAZILIAN INHERITANCE, 1750-1821 (2003) [hereinafter 1 LEWIN,
SURPRISE HEIRS], 2 LINDA LEWIN, SURPRISE HEIRS: ILLEGITIMACY, INHERITANCE RIGHTS, AND
PUBLIC POWER IN THE FORMATION OF IMPERIAL BRAZIL, 1822-1889 (2003); REBECCA J.
SCOTT, DEGREES OF FREEDOM: LOUISIANA AND CUBA AFTER SLAVERY (2005); and VICTOR M.
URIBE-URAN, HONORABLE LIVES: LAWYERS, FAMILY, AND POLITICS IN COLOMBIA, 1780-1850
(2000).
4.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 12 (2d ed. 1985)
(emphasis omitted). For a discussion of Latin-American historiography and its relationship
to more recent trends in the writing of social history, see Carlos Aguirre & Ricardo D.
Salvatore, Introduction: Writing the History of Law, Crime, and Punishment in Latin
America, in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: LAW AND SOCIETY SINCE LATE
COLONIAL TIMES 1, 1-32 (Ricardo D. Salvatore et al. eds., 2001).
5.
See Arrom, supra note 3, at 461-65 (noting from a historical perspective how
Mexican law affected local communities).
6.
For an edited volume of papers discussing the difficulties of establishing effective
conditions allowing law to protect the powerless in Latin America, see generally THE
(UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA (Juan E. Méndez et al. eds.,
1999) [hereinafter THE (UN)RULE OF LAW].
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formalism and relatively narrow emphasis on legal doctrine in the
training of lawyers and legal scholars at most law faculties in Latin
America, inhibiting the development of legal scholars as well as
practicing attorneys comfortable with the social sciences and prepared
to integrate into legal analysis social, economic, or cultural factors
necessary to do a truly interdisciplinary legal history.7
Underdeveloped in the Latin-American legal historiography is
the kind of historical sociology of law suggested by U.S. legal
historian William Novak.8 Novak, in an article examining James
Willard Hurst, discussed the work of the pioneering legal historian and
his role in moving the historiography of U.S. law from its fairly
narrow doctrinal origins to a broader field of inquiry.9 This inquiry
encompassed “‘a broad concern with law’s operational ties to other
components of social order [that] will lead to the contributions the
study of legal history should make to an illuminating sociology of
law.’”10 This kind of historical sociology of law would presumably
use law and its history not merely to illustrate the evolution of legal
doctrine, or how the law resolved certain controversies, or even how it
was influenced by the social currents of different eras. It would do
these things of course, but it would presumably do something more. It
would use the law as a window into the very civilization being studied.
It would recognize that the law, both as stated and as actually applied,
in the values expressed and in the promises unrealized, reveals a
society and its culture in both its aims and its contradictions. This
approach, I would argue, is an especially important one to bring to the
study of legal history in Latin America. Many students of LatinAmerican law have long noted the gap between the law as stated and
the law as actually applied.11 There has been in the history of law in
Latin America what might be termed a kind of normative nominalism,
7.
See my discussion of Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Joaquim Benedito Barbosa
Gomes’ call for the Brazilian adoption of some aspects of legal realism in cases involving
race in Robert J. Cottrol, Brown and the Contemporary Brazilian Struggle Against Racial
Inequality: Some Preliminary Comparative Thoughts, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 113, 124-27 (2004)
(outlining Justice Gomes’ reconciliation of affirmative action with the Brazilian
Constitution). For a good, short overview of Brazilian legal education, see Nadia de Araujo,
Estado de la Educación Legal Brasileña, 70 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 783 passim (2001).
8.
See William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism, and the Liberal State: The Historical
Sociology of James Willard Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 140-45 (2000).
9.
See id. at 98-99.
10. Id. at 99 (quoting Willard Hurst, The Law in United States History, 104 PROC.
AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 518, 521 (1960)).
11. See, e.g., Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, The Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in
Latin America: Introduction, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 1, 1-15 (asserting
that the new democratic constitutions of most Latin American countries did not effectively
reform legal institutions or change state agents’ practices).
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a desire to use the law to make important normative statements,
followed by often minimalist or nominal enforcement or application of
legal norms.12 By no means has this been an exclusively LatinAmerican phenomenon. One need consider only the unhappy fate of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or the Fifteenth
Amendment’s protection of racial minorities’ voting rights in the
United States in the first half of the twentieth century to realize this.13
But the gap between legal norms and legal applications has been
stronger in Latin America than in many other societies. In some ways,
the gap has become institutionalized with ordinary citizens, and indeed
even public officials, routinely anticipating that the stated rules cannot
reasonably be followed and adjusting their behavior on that
assumption.14 All of this makes seeing Latin-American legal history
with the kind of historical-sociological lens that Novak suggested
more interesting and more compelling.
This Essay examines three books that bring us closer to the
integration of Latin-American legal history with the broader political
and social history of the region. The three books, O fiador dos
brasileiros: Cidadania, escravidão e direito civil no tempo de Antonio
Pereira Rebouças,15 Measures of Equality:
Social Science,
16
Citizenship, and Race in Cuba, 1902-1940, and Drowning in Laws:
Labor Law and Brazilian Political Culture17 have all been published
since 2001 and represent the newer effort by historians and social
scientists concerned with Latin America to integrate legal and social
history. Taken together, the three works raise important questions
concerning the often profound disjuncture between legal norms and
social practice that frequently occurs in much of Latin America. This
disjuncture is often most glaring when issues of race and class
inequality are considered. All three books give different and important
perspectives on this critical issue for scholars concerned with law and
Latin-American culture.

12.
13.

Id. at 2.
See ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE
AND THE CONSTITUTION 34-39 (2003).
14. See generally Keith S. Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil’s Institutional Bypass of the
Formal Legal System and Its Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. COMP. LAW 514 (1971).
15. KEILA GRINBERG, O FIADOR DOS BRASILEIROS: CIDADANIA, ESCRAVIDÃO E DIREITO
CIVIL NO TEMPO DE ANTONIO PEREIRA REBOUÇAS (2002).
16. ALEJANDRA BRONFMAN, MEASURES OF EQUALITY: SOCIAL SCIENCE, CITIZENSHIP,
AND RACE IN CUBA, 1902-1940 (2004).
17. JOHN D. FRENCH, DROWNING IN LAWS: LABOR LAW AND BRAZILIAN POLITICAL
CULTURE (2004).
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This Essay will examine these three books, and it is divided into
three Parts. The first Part discusses Keila Grinberg’s O fiador dos
brasileiros, placing her biographical study within the context of the
paradox of the nineteenth-century Brazilian Empire. The Brazilian
Empire’s Constitution of 1824 (1824 Constitution) has rightly been
described by historians as liberal, and yet it governed the society
whose economy was probably more dependent on slave labor than any
other nation in the Americas in the nineteenth century.18 The second
Part looks at Alejandra Bronfman’s Measures of Equality and how the
new racial thinking of the early twentieth century helped shape the
behavior of legal actors in Cuba and the drafting of the racially liberal,
but ultimately ineffective, Constitution of 1940. The third Part
considers John French’s Drowning in Laws and what his volume can
tell us not only about labor law, social hierarchy, and political culture
in twentieth-century Brazil, but also what his study suggests about the
overall effectiveness of law and legal institutions in Brazil more
generally.
II.

LIBERAL CONSTITUTION, CONSERVATIVE CULTURE: THE
SCHIZOPHRENIC BRAZILIAN EMPIRE

Antonio Pereira Rebouças, the subject of Grinberg’s biography,
in many ways led a life that encapsulated the contradictions that were
the nineteenth-century Brazilian Empire.19 A prominent lawyer,
juriscounsult (or legal commentator), and politician of the Brazilian
Empire, Rebouças’s life in many ways embodied the contest that was
being waged for the soul of the giant empire in the nineteenth
century.20 A mulatto, the son of a Portuguese father and a liberta, or
manumitted, mother, Rebouças would rise high in the legal and
political cultures of nineteenth-century Brazil, yet he would always be
subject to spoken and unspoken prejudices due to his race and color.21
An opponent of racial discrimination, Rebouças would nonetheless
become a slaveholder and would defend slaveholders in court in
manumission suits between slaves and slave owners.22 Rebouças
could eloquently argue against discrimination against free black and

18. HERBERT S. KLEIN, THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE 37-38 (1999).
19. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 153-54.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 201-02 (noting that Rebouças participated in four suits representing slaves
and five representing slave owners).
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mulatto citizens of Brazil while still supporting the suppression of
slave revolts and decrying what he saw as African barbarism.23
In O fiador dos brasileiros, Grinberg captures the ideological,
economic, and cultural crosscurrents that were an integral part of the
Brazilian Empire reflected in the newly-formed empire’s 1824
Constitution and the statutes, decrees, and court decisions that were a
part of nineteenth-century Brazilian law.24 The Enlightenment, the
liberal imagination that would transform the Atlantic world in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was having an influence on
Portugal and her giant Brazilian colony.25 Toward the end of the
eighteenth century, Brazilian elites, chafing under Portugal’s
mercantilist restrictions, began to find justification for greater
autonomy, at least for themselves, in the liberal political philosophies
developed in France and elsewhere in Europe.26 These led to abortive
struggles for independence in various Brazilian venues, including
Rebouças’s native Bahia.27 If these struggles proved unsuccessful in
separating Brazil from Portugal, they nonetheless helped increase a
sense of nationalism among Brazilian elites and indeed, as Brazilian
historian Emilia Viotti da Costa has noted, among many of the
Brazilian masses, slave and free, as well.28 These elites hoped that
independence and the liberal ideals that independence advocates were
espousing would lead to freedom and better conditions.29 The
Napoleonic Wars would ultimately give independence advocates their
victory.30 The French Emperor’s occupation of Portugal in 1808
would force the displacement of the Portuguese Monarch to Brazil.31
By 1815, Brazil was declared a kingdom united with Portugal.32 By
1822, Brazil had declared itself an independent empire with Pedro I as
its emperor.33
The new empire would need a new constitution, but what would
be its basis? If liberal ideals had informed the movement for
independence and had served as a vehicle for rallying the population to
the nationalist standard, liberalism also posed a problem for the new
23. Id. at 174.
24. Id. at 23-35.
25. See EMILIA VIOTTI DA COSTA, THE BRAZILIAN EMPIRE: MYTHS AND HISTORIES 5861 (rev. ed. 2000).
26. See id.
27. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 48-49.
28. DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 7-12.
29. Id. at 10-12.
30. See id. at 12, 15-23.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 17-20.
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nation’s most important economic and social institution—slavery.34
This problem was not, of course, uniquely Brazilian. Throughout the
Americas, the revolutions for independence generally informed by
broad liberal notions of “the rights of man” left the first-generation
constitution drafters with the question of what to do about slavery.35
The nations that secured their independence from Spain quickly
recognized, as a legal principle, that slavery was incompatible with the
professed ideals of their struggles for independence and indeed their
new constitutions.36 The Spanish-speaking nations that would emerge
from the independence struggles took different routes to emancipation.
Mexico abolished slavery directly by statute in 1829, nineteen years
after independence.37 Other nations, like Peru and Argentina, had long
tortured routes toward emancipation with significant efforts to reverse
or ignore earlier legislative attempts to put a gradual end to slavery.38
Many statesmen of the founding generation in the United States
recognized the incompatibility of slavery and the professed ideals of
the American Revolution and Constitution, although the Constitution
did recognize property rights in human beings, even providing a
fugitive-slave clause to add federal protection to the institution.39 It
nonetheless should be added that any discussion of the United States
and the reaction of the founding generation to the contradiction
between liberalism and slavery should also include a discussion of
state statutes, constitutions, and judicial decisions. If the nation as a
whole failed to live up to its professed ideals, it is nonetheless
important to note that at least half the states, those northern states
where slavery was not central to the economy, did act on the ideals of
the American Revolution, legally beginning the process of ending
slavery within their borders.40
34. See id. at 22-23, 126-27.
35. Id. at 58-62.
36. Cf. GEORGE REID ANDREWS, AFRO-LATIN AMERICA, 1800-2000, at 90-91 (2004).
37. LESLIE B. ROUT, JR., THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE IN SPANISH AMERICA 279-82
(Markus Wiener Publishers 2003) (1976).
38. See, e.g., Guyora Binder, The Slavery of Emancipation, 17 CARDOZO L. REV.
2063, 2079 (noting the “gradual emancipation plan” in Argentina). For an important
discussion of the difficulties of achieving final abolition in Peru and the role of AfroPeruvians in achieving that abolition see CARLOS AGUIRRE, AGENTES DE SU PROPIA LIBERTAD:
LOS ESCLAVOS DE LIMA Y LA DESINTEGRACIÓN DE LA ESCLAVITUD, 1821-1854 (1993).
39. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XIII; see
Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach: Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism Through
the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1773, 1788 (2006) (noting Thomas
Jefferson’s concern that slavery was incongruent with the ideals of the American Revolution).
40. For a discussion of northern emancipation, see generally ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT,
THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH (1967). Ira Berlin
makes the important point that northern abolition was a more difficult and problematic
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Brazilians too recognized that slavery contradicted the professed
liberal ideals for which the struggle for independence had been
waged.41 But slavery was more profoundly a part of the Brazilian
social order than had been the case in the former Spanish colonies or
even, for the most part, the southern part of the United States.42 By
1822, over one-third of the Brazilian population was enslaved.43
Better than seventy percent of the population consisted of blacks or
mulattoes, slave, liberto,44 and free.45 Between 1801 and 1860, Brazil
imported some 1,719,500 African slaves, more than three times the
number imported into British North America and the United States in
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries combined.46
Owning slaves was not merely a means to a livelihood—the
cultivation of a sugar plantation in Bahia or the extraction of gold from
a mine in Minas Gerais—it was a symbol of a person’s wealth, power,
and indeed status, an indication to all that one was part of the better
classes.47
It was against this background that Brazil’s 1824 Constitution
was debated and finally adopted.48 The 1824 Constitution reflected the
influence of the Enlightenment and its ideas of fundamental rights and
equality for all citizens.49 Title 2 of the 1824 Constitution recognized
process than generally has been appreciated. See IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE
FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 228-55 (1998).
41. DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 126-27; Antonio Penalves Rocha, Idéias
antiescravistas da Ilustração na sociedade escravista brasileira, 20 REV. BRASILEIRA DE
HISTÓRIA 37 passim (2000) (Braz.).
42. Cf. ANDREWS, supra note 36, at 55.
43. DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 128.
44. Liberto status was something of a midpoint between slavery and freedom.
Manumission in Brazil was typically accomplished by means of a document known as an
alforria. EUNICE APARECIDA DE JESUS PRUDENTE, PRECONCEITO RACIAL E IGUALDADE
JURÍDICA NO BRASIL 93 (1989). It was discretionary on the part of the slave owner and could
be accompanied by conditions. Id. at 93-94. Those who were conditionally manumitted had
the status of libertos. Id. at 95-97. In some cases their manumissions could be revoked. Id.
One potential ground for revocation was ingratitude, a condition that of course maintained, or
possibly increased, patron-client ties between libertos and former masters. Id. The
Constitution of 1824 made libertos citizens, although they were prohibited from voting. Id.
The children of libertos were ingênuos, and they had voting rights. Id.; see Robert J. Cottrol,
The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of Racial Hierarchy and
Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL. L. REV. 11, 57 (2001).
45. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 46.
46. KLEIN, supra note 18, app. tbl. A-2. By way of comparison, the total number of
Africans estimated to have been forcibly brought into what is now the United States is
559,800; the total number to Brazil 4,029,800. See id.
47. Cf. Cottrol, supra note 44, at 56.
48. See DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 58-61 (discussing the debates and adoption of
the 1824 Constitution).
49. See id.
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the citizenship of all free Brazilians, including libertos.50 Title 8
recognized the principles of freedom of speech and of the press, of
freedom from religious persecution, freedom of the home from
government searches, the right to due process in criminal procedures,
and prohibitions on ex post facto criminal law.51 Title 8 also prohibited
torture, special privileges, and recognized the equality of all citizens
before the law.52 Although the 1824 Constitution did not mention
slavery, it had strong guarantees for property rights that were generally
recognized as protecting the rights of slaveholders.53 Of equal or
probably even greater importance, the 1824 Constitution insured that
political power would remain in the hands of slaveholding elites.54
Property and income qualifications for voting allowed few men who
were not of the elite, slaveholding class the opportunity to participate
in politics.55
The profound paradox presented by the imperial Brazilian
constitutional order lay in a curious combination of constitutional
liberalism, race-based slavery, and the formal commitment of the law
to the ideal of equality for all, regardless of race or color.56 In some
ways it was a cognitive dissonance even more profound than that
found in the constitutional order in the United States. If the U.S.
Constitution originally had nothing explicit to say concerning race,
before the Civil War, it also had no provisions defining citizenship or
asserting the equal status before the law of all citizens.57 Race-based
slavery existed in the United States but it was largely justified, i.e.,
made coherent in a liberal society, through a national ideology that
increasingly used principles of racial inferiority and the doctrine that
even free Negroes were not citizens.58 Brazil could not easily turn to
50. CONSTITUIÇÃO POLÍTICA DO IMPÉRIO DO BRASIL DE 1824 [BRAZILIAN EMPIRE
CONSTITUTION OF 1824] tit. 2, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/
brazil1824.html.
51. Id. tit. 8.
52. Id.
53. See id. tit 8, art. 179, § XXII.
54. See DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 58-62.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See Robert J. Cottrol, The Thirteenth Amendment and the North’s Overlooked
Egalitarian Heritage, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 198, 199-200 (1990) (noting that an impetus
behind the Thirteenth Amendment was establishing a mechanism for equality).
58. This, like all generalizations, is too broad and fails to capture the full complexity
of race and legal status in the antebellum United States. Id. at 202-03. There was, as I have
argued previously, a period roughly between the end of the American Revolution and the
1820s, and in some states later, where black men enjoyed the status of citizens—as evidenced
by their having the right to vote—if they could satisfy existing property qualifications. Id.
These suffrage rights existed in a majority of states, both North and South, and only began to
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racialist ideology as a source of justification for its slave system.59
Profound racism existed, to be sure, in nineteenth-century Brazil.
Race and color prejudice combined with strong class barriers and,
often, profound cultural distances between slaves, who were often
recently imported Africans and free Brazilians of both Portuguese and
African descent.60 But these barriers did not give rise to the rigid kinds
of legal distinctions that, more often than not, limited the lives of
people of African descent in the United States in the era of slavery and
beyond.61
Grinberg provides an important insight into the formation of the
Brazilian constitutional and social order when she discusses the impact
of the Haitian revolution on Brazilian constitutional debates.62 The
revolution in Santo Domingo had the effect of horrifying slave owners
throughout the Americas, spurring some toward quicker acceptance of
proposed emancipatory measures, moving others toward greater
repression, and causing still others to consent to the adoption of
ameliorative measures designed to forestall potential rebellion as well
as criticisms from a Western world increasingly skeptical of slavery.63
be lost in the nineteenth century, ironically at the same time as the broadening of suffrage
rights, i.e., the dropping of property requirements that occurred for white men. Id.
(discussing suffrage rights of free black men in the antebellum United States). Supreme
Court Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis used the existence of black suffrage at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution to make a persuasive argument that free Negroes were citizens in
his dissent in Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott). See 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 573-76 (1856)
(Curtis, J., dissenting), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Arguably the situation in
slave states, such as North Carolina and Tennessee where free black men retained the right to
vote until the mid-1830s, bore a great deal of resemblance to the legal and social order that
existed in the Brazilian Empire, i.e., slavery had the sanction of law, it was based on race, and
yet an individual of the enslaved race could attain citizen status. Compare Cottrol, supra note
44, at 50 (discussing the rights of free black men in the antebellum South) with DA COSTA,
supra note 25, at 125-28 (discussing Brazil’s transition from free to slave labor). As the
nineteenth century unfolded, the possibility for that kind of ambiguity in racial ideology in
the slave states of the United States became less and less possible as free Negroes in the
southern states became subject to an increasing regime of restrictions making clear the rights
associated with citizenship would be reserved for whites. See generally IRA BERLIN, SLAVES
WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1974) (discussing the
emergence and culture of free Blacks in the antebellum South). For a good discussion of
regional variation in the legal status of free blacks in the antebellum North, see Paul
Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum
North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415 passim (1986).
59. DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 55-62, 234-46.
60. Id.; see JOÃO JOSÉ REIS, SLAVE REBELLION IN BRAZIL: THE MUSLIM UPRISING OF
1835 IN BAHIA 5, 63, 142 (Arthur Brakel trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1993) (1986).
61. Cottrol, supra note 57, at 199-206 (discussing the struggle for racial equality
following the Civil War).
62. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 50-51.
63. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN
THE NEW WORLD 212-14, 237 (2006).
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In Brazil, the realization that free mulattoes had joined with rebellious
slaves in Santo Domingo caused a fear that similar alliances might
occur in Brazil.64 This certainly contributed to a greater willingness on
the part of the drafters of the 1824 Constitution to accept the principle
of equal rights and citizenship for all free Brazilians.65
Rebouças’s legal and political career helps give us some sense of
how free Brazilians in the nineteenth century navigated their nation’s
cognitively difficult combination of race, slavery, and enlightenment
values.66 For Rebouças, liberal values, a rejection of discrimination
based on race or color, a revulsion against African culture and an
acceptance—and indeed participation to a point—in the system of
slavery all were part of a coherent way of looking at the world and one
that was by no means singular in the Brazilian Empire of the early
nineteenth century.67 This world view was shaped by the dynamics of
a slave society, which although based almost from the beginning on
the enslavement of Africans and their descendants,68 had social and
demographic currents that made race per se less important than it
would be in a society like the United States.69 The very harshness of
Brazilian slavery insured that there would be a continuous importation
of new African slaves to replace those who perished in the harsh
conditions that prevailed in the plantations of Bahia or the mines of
Minas Gerais.70 These Africans would be culturally distinctive and not
infrequently frightening not only to whites but often to native born
Afro-Brazilians as well.71 The society that had emerged by the early
64. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 50-51.
65. See id. The influence of French thought and French examples more broadly also
had significant influence on the development of Brazilian political and constitutional thought.
See DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 2-52. French enlightenment thought was a guiding
influence in the struggles for independence; yet, the excesses of the French Revolution
horrified Brazilian elites, helping to produce a more conservative approach to the constitution
and the building of the independent Brazilian state. Id. at 27-46 (discussing this within the
context of the career of nineteenth-century Brazilian statesman José Bonifácio de Andrada e
Silva).
66. See GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 153-54, 201-02.
67. See id. at 24-30.
68. The Portuguese had begun the process of enslaving Africans even before their
settlement of Brazil. Although there were efforts to enslave the indigenous population in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the intercession of the Catholic Church had caused the
Portuguese Crown to outlaw formally the practice in the seventeenth century, even though
some enslavement of Indians continued informally beyond that point. See id. Still, Africans
and their descendants were the principal group that was enslaved in Brazil and other parts of
the Americas. See id.; FREDERIC MAURO, LE PORTUGAL, LE BRESIL ET L’ATLANTIQUE AU
XVIIE SIECLE (1570-1670), at 166-71 (1983).
69. See DA COSTA, supra note 25, 181-201.
70. See id. at 132-39.
71. Id.
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nineteenth century was one where slaves were often predominately
African.72 It was also one where African culture, often including
Islamic-African culture—often seen as a distinct challenge to
Portuguese Catholicism—provided a cultural basis for rebellious
behavior on the part of slaves, either through outright revolts or the
establishment of reconstituted African communities and cultures, the
quilombos.73
Many native born Afro-Brazilians managed to attain their
freedom and a measure of equality despite the harshness of Brazilian
slavery.74 This occurred in part because the paucity of Portuguese
settlers in Brazil left social and economic space for a free AfroBrazilian class capable of filling such roles as free artisan, truck
farmer, and enlisted soldier, among others, that were filled by poor
whites in the slave societies of North America.75 Mulattoes, like
Rebouças, were also able to benefit from formal family ties with
whites, such as legal recognition as legitimate children of white
fathers.76 This formal recognition and consequent support were
particularly important in Brazilian society where personal
advancement was often strongly dependent on family ties and patronclient relations.77
By giving us the Rebouças story as a man of the law in the early
Brazilian Empire, Grinberg does much to shed light on the complex
web of race, color, culture, class, and clientism in nineteenth-century
Brazil.78 Rebouças began as an outsider to the elite world of
practitioners of law and state affairs, the world of the bacharel in
which he would attain preeminence.79 His status as a mulatto
contributed to this and throughout his career would lead to charges that
he sympathized with slave rebellions or that he sought to recreate a

72. Id.
73. See GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 144 (discussing Rebouças’s role in putting down
the slave rebellion in 1835); REIS, supra note 60, at 112-28 (discussing the role of Islam in
the Bahian slave rebellion).
74. FRANCISCO VIDAL LUNA & HERBERT S. KLEIN, SLAVERY AND THE ECONOMY OF
SÃO PAULO: 1750-1850, at 158 (2003).
75. Id. at 158-63.
76. This was true not only for legitimate children, but, as Linda Lewin informs us,
Brazilian law had mechanisms to remedy or cure illegitimacy that was often presumed in
cases involving people of African descent. See 1 LEWIN, SURPRISE HEIRS, supra note 3, at
63-64. Illegitimacy was considered a “defect” of birth. See id. It was also possible in the
colonial period to have a “defect” of color, i.e., African or indigenous ancestry by royal
certificate. See id.
77. See DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 188-91.
78. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 153-54, 201-02.
79. Id. at 186.
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revolution similar to the one that had occurred in Santo Domingo.80
But race was not the only reason Rebouças was an unlikely candidate
for this elite world of law and governance. The Brazilian bar and the
bacharel class more generally were dominated by the sons of the elite,
young men who had the time and money to study law, philosophy, and
political economy at Portugal’s Coimbra University.81 Rebouças had
neither and instead taught himself the law while working as a clerk in
a notarial office.82 His efforts paid off. In 1821, he was admitted to
the practice of law with all the privileges normally reserved for
graduates of the Portuguese university.83 By 1823, in part because of
his support for the cause of independence, Rebouças met with
Emperor Dom Pedro I, was appointed to a government position, and
was made a Knight of the Order of the Cruzeiro.84 His public career
was underway.
It is easy, too easy, to see an historical public figure’s public life
and policy positions simply as an extension of his personal biography,
social background, struggles for achievement and recognition, and as
the sum total of his personal alliances and animosities. We would like
to believe, and indeed should believe, that more goes into the stands a
public figure takes on the issues of his time. This would be especially
problematic to do with Rebouças, a complex man of both strong
ambition and profound learning. And yet Rebouças’s constitutional
vision clearly owed much to both the harsh realities of social prejudice
with which he was familiar as well as the potentialities for equality and
mobility that the 1824 Constitution provided.85 Rebouças firmly
resisted encroachments on the legal equality promised by the 1824
Constitution.86 The struggle over who could be an officer in the
National Guard was particularly revealing of Rebouças’s views of the
links between law, race, and civilization.87 As a member of the
Chamber of Deputies, in 1832 he opposed a measure that would have
prevented libertos from receiving commissions in the National Guard,
a militia controlled by the central government and used for internal
security.88 Rebouças denounced the measure as “unjust, incendiary,

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 24-26, 102-03.
Id. at 238-42.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 34-35, 85, 101-02.
Id.
Id. at 101-02.
See DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 66, 68, 72-73, 186.
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impolitic, and unconstitutional.”89 He noted that libertos aided in the
struggle for independence.90 More revealingly, Rebouças cautioned
his fellow deputies that they were following the dangerous example of
the French in Haiti.91 By excluding libertos and other free people of
color from the rights of citizenship in Haiti, they had set the stage for
an alliance between the African slaves of that island and the free
people of color who should have been the allies of the French.92
Grinberg discusses Rebouças’s position on the National Guard
issue, noting that the Bahian deputy differed from a number of his
liberal peers who were prepared to restrict the rights of libertos as a
means of reinforcing the social order in which racial boundaries were
important, even if not specifically sanctioned by law.93 And yet
Rebouças’s dissent in this regard is not at all hard to understand.
Rebouças’s fight for a broadly inclusive vision of citizenship was one
that validated his own being—that of the self-made man of color who
was able to use the law’s lack of formal restrictions, his own talents,
and a bit of good fortune in securing powerful patrons to rise in a
society where social prejudices were strongly arrayed against him.94 It
was a formula that had not only worked well for Antonio Rebouças,
but, as Grinberg informs us, for two of his brothers as well.95
Rebouças feared the growth of the kind of restrictions that had
occurred in France’s Caribbean colony were increasing in the United

89. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 102 (author translation).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 102-03.
92. Historian Gwendolyn Midlo Hall discussed the growth of discrimination and
legal restrictions against free mulattoes in Haiti throughout the course of the eighteenth
century. Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, Saint Dominigue, in NEITHER SLAVE NOR FREE: THE
FREEDMEN OF AFRICAN DESCENT IN THE SLAVE SOCIETIES OF THE NEW WORLD 172, 174-79
(David W. Cohen & Jack P. Greene eds., 1972). Her research indicated that what had been a
fairly mobile society for free people of color at the beginning of the eighteenth century
became more and more restrictive toward the century’s end as French planters sought to
maintain control over the expanding plantation economy. See id. Despite this, even at the
end of the eighteenth century, Saint Dominigue (Santo Domingo) nonetheless had a
significant free mulatto elite who were themselves planters and slaveholders. See id. Also,
see historian Laurent Dubois’ discussion of increasing restrictions on the legal rights of gens
de couleur and the loss of rights once guaranteed under the code noir in the French Caribbean
in LAURENT DUBOIS, A COLONY OF CITIZENS: REVOLUTION & SLAVE EMANCIPATION IN THE
FRENCH CARIBBEAN, 1787-1804, at 73-80 (2004).
93. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 101-02.
94. Id. at 77-78.
95. Grinberg notes that one brother, Manoel Maurício, studied medicine in Paris and
later practiced and taught medicine in Bahia and another, José Pereira, studied classical music
in Europe and became master of the Orchestral Theater in Salvador, Bahia. Id. at 70. A third
brother Manoel Pereira was less successful. Id. He spent his working life as an office clerk.
Id.

2007]

NORMATIVE NOMINALISM

15

States at the time, and were closing off the possibilities of citizenship
and equality that had so benefitted Rebouças and his family.96
But Rebouças, who could eloquently and forcefully defend the
rights of all free citizens and, indeed, demonstrate a special concern for
the rights of free and liberto Afro-Brazilians, had a decidedly less
liberal record with regard to slavery.97 His views in some respects
might be difficult for North Americans accustomed to equating racial
liberalism with antislavery sentiment to sort out, but they were not all
that singular in the Brazilian society of the first half of the nineteenth
century.98 Rebouças at once believed slaves to be outside of “the
Empire of law and rights” which governed free people.99 Slaves were
property with only limited claims to the law’s protection.100 Yet,
Rebouças strongly believed in the meritocratic ideal that allowed
manumissions and the acquisition of citizenship and equal rights for
libertos, the recently manumitted.101 He rejected racial restrictions on
citizenship yet felt no problems denouncing African culture and
African-led slave revolts and using the specter of such revolts to press
the case for an alliance of the free regardless of color.102 As a deputy,
Rebouças would support the abolition of the slave trade and yet would
argue the case less on moral grounds and more on the grounds that the
trade had to be outlawed to placate British sentiment.103 He would
also argue for the importation of free Africans as agricultural
laborers.104
Grinberg details Rebouças’s political career and how the political
demands of Brazil’s increasingly conservative 1830s helped produce a
conservative reaction in Rebouças that would later cause critics to see
him as a representative of an old liberalism centered around the 1824
Constitution and that failed attempt to adapt to Brazil’s evolving
political and social realities.105 Particularly telling was his opposition
to the Sabinada rebellion of 1837, a rebellion led by free mulattoes
motivated in part because social prejudices were increasingly cutting
off avenues of upward mobility, particularly in the military.106
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 108-09, 117-18.
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id. (author translation).
Id.
Id. at 100-07.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 170-72.
Id. at 24-26.
Id. at 150-51.
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Reboucas’s reticence with respect to this rebellion might be seen as
part of his larger nationalist ideology, his strong support for national
unity, and his opposition to a number of regional rebellions that were
occurring in Brazil in the early decades of the nineteenth century.107
Rebouças’s political career effectively ended in 1848 with
electoral defeat.108 He would devote the rest of his career to his law
practice.109 Grinberg is especially skillful at showing how Rebouças’s
complex combinations of sentiments and interests played out in one
part of his practice, disputes over manumission claims.110 Students of
slavery in the Americas have long known that in Brazil, as indeed in
other parts of Latin America, slaves could make legally enforceable
contracts for manumission.111 These contracts usually specified prices
and terms under which slaves could purchase their freedom.112 In the
cities of Latin America, including such Brazilian urban centers as
Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, the ability of slaves to make
legally binding manumission contracts, coupled with the constant
demand for labor that existed in the urban economies, contributed
greatly to the growth of free Afro-American populations.113 In Brazil,
Rio de Janeiro’s Tribunal da Relação had appellate jurisdictions over
107. Grinberg makes the interesting point that Rebouças saw his very identity as a
mulatto as emblematic of Brazilian national unity. Id. at 150. His view that because his
ancestry included both races he could empathize with all Brazilians enabling him to be “O
fiador dos brasileiros” or “the guardian of the Brazilians.” Id. In a curious way, Rebouças
anticipated the racial ideology of a number of twentieth-century Latin-American thinkers
who emphasized that mestizaje, or race mixture, was critical to the formation of various
national identities in Latin America. GILBERTO FREYRE, BRAZIL: AN INTERPRETATION 94-108
(1945). This was particularly true of Brazilian social scientist Gilberto Freyre, who stressed
the importance of race mixture and the resulting mulatto population to the formation of
Brazilian national identity. Id.; see GILBERTO FREYRE, THE MASTERS AND THE SLAVES: A
STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRAZILIAN CIVILIZATION 66-84 (Samuel Putnam trans., Univ.
of Cal. Press 2d rev. ed. 1986) (1971).
108. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 197-200.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 201-07.
111. See, e.g., FRANK TANNENBAUM, SLAVE AND CITIZEN: THE NEGRO IN THE
AMERICAS 52-62, 99-107 (1946); ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS 142-57
(1989).
112. TANNENBAUM, supra note 111, at 54-57 (discussing manumission in Cuba);
WATSON, supra note 111, at 54-55 (noting the development of manumission in Spanish
America).
113. It should be noted that throughout the Americas cities were the venues where
slaves were most likely to achieve freedom through self-purchase. T. STEPHEN WHITMAN,
THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: SLAVERY AND MANUMISSION IN BALTIMORE AND EARLY NATIONAL
MARYLAND 3-14 (1997) (discussing the growth of the free Negro population in Baltimore).
Although the law in the southern states of the United States did not recognize the
enforceability of manumission contracts, agreements between masters and slaves for self
purchase and manumission existed nonetheless and were often honored, resulting in the
growth of free Negro populations in a number of southern cities. Id.
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such cases known as “actions for freedom.”114 Here Grinberg was able
to draw on her earlier work that examined the functioning of that court
in freedom suits allowing her to place Rebouças’s advocacy before the
Rio court in broader context.115
Grinberg’s discussion provides a truly valuable synthesis of legal,
as well as social and cultural, analysis. Rebouças would enter practice
in Rio mostly representing property holders seeking indemnity from
the government for losses incurred during the struggle for
independence.116 His talent, ambition, and political connections had
brought him into the ranks of the imperial city’s elite.117 He had a
grand home, which included a magnificent library of nearly 3000
volumes.118 Rebouças was the owner of seven slaves who acted as his
house servants.119 And most importantly his admission to practice
before the Brazilian Empire’s highest courts, despite not having a law
degree, ensured that he could maintain a lucrative practice to support
his seigneurial lifestyle.120
O fiador dos brasileiros takes us through the complex and
changing ideological and legal terrain that shaped both advocacy and
judicial decision making in the manumission cases.121 Certainly a
foundational principle of Brazilian constitutionalism was the
inviolability of property rights.122 This was consistently reiterated by a
parliament and indeed a social elite in which slaveholders predominated.123
Yet, Brazilian law recognized manumission and indeed liberal
sentiment in the empire was becoming increasingly antislavery as the
nineteenth century unfolded.124 The contradiction between slavery and
Brazil’s at least nominally liberal values was increasingly being
recognized by more and more members of Brazil’s elites, including
members of the bar.125 Grinberg outlines the important role played by
the Brazilian bar, particularly from the 1860s onward, in moving the
114. The actual term in Portuguese was ações de liberdade or actions of liberty. See
KEILA GRINBERG, LIBERATA: A LEI DA AMBIGÜIDADE (1994).
115. See generally id.
116. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 197-98.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 199.
119. Id. at 198. Grinberg notes that Rebouças inherited his slaves from his father-inlaw and that they were freed by self-purchase in the 1860s. Id. at 218-19.
120. Id. at 198-99.
121. Id. at 201-11.
122. DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 59-62.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 164-65.
125. See id. at 74-77.
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courts toward a promanumission posture.126 To do this, both bar and
bench had to fight some of the newer developments in legal
methodology.127 Civil law jurisdictions, particularly in the wake of the
French Revolution, were moving toward greater codification as a
device to reign in both creative advocacy and judicial latitude through
strict adherence to codified rules.128 This ideal, of a jurisprudence
constrained by a code and technical rules, ran up against the increased
antislavery sentiment of members of the bar.129 It also ran up against
the equities of individual manumission cases, despite the law’s
presumptions in favor of the property rights of slave owners.130 These
presumptions usually placed the burden of proof on the slave to
demonstrate both the existence of a manumission agreement and that
the slave had fulfilled the contractual requisites.131 Grinberg is
especially insightful in showing how antislavery lawyers used multiple
sources of law: Roman law, Canon law, concepts of natural law taught
at Coimbra, customary law, and other authorities were used to make
the argument for freedom in individual cases where the positive law
seemingly argued against manumission.132
The Tribunaisdais
Relações (Relations Tribunals) would reject the view that it was bound
by stare decisis, instead holding to a broad view of its interpretive
preroga-tives.133
It is in her discussion of the legal profession’s balancing of the
demands of its own antislavery idealism with the often harsh realities
of proslavery positive law where Grinberg supplies a masterful
interdisciplinary synthesis that combines a strong technical
understanding of nineteenth-century Brazilian legal history with the
history of ideas, particularly political philosophy, and the sociology of
group consciousness. In part, Grinberg’s discussion treads on some of
the same ground explored by Robert Cover, in another context, when
he looked at the response of antislavery northern jurists confronted
with the dilemma of enforcing proslavery positive law, including
federal fugitive-slave legislation.134 Grinberg sees the reaction of the
126. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 233-43.
127. See id.
128. See generally M.C. Mirow, The Power of Codification in Latin America: Simón
Bolívar and the Code Napoléon, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83 (2000).
129. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 216-17.
130. See id. at 217.
131. Id. at 217-18.
132. Id. at 233-39.
133. Id. at 238-39.
134. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 175-91 (1975).
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bar and bench in Rio in the latter half of the nineteenth century as an
example of the autonomy of the legal profession and to an extent it
certainly is.135 But as Grinberg demonstrates, it is also a study in class
attitudes and ideologies and how the legal profession and an important
segment of the literate, university-educated bacharel class came to be
connected to the wider world of liberal thought in the late nineteenth
century and, by doing so, came to reject slavery and use the judicial
process to undermine it.
Rebouças too would come to develop stronger antislavery views
toward the end of the nineteenth century and his life.136 His son,
Andreas, would become a significant figure in Brazil’s abolitionist
movement as well as a collaborator with that nation’s great abolition
Through her study of Rebouças,
leader Joaquim Nabuco.137
previously a largely forgotten man in Brazilian history, Keila Grinberg
has provided us with the kind of study of a life in the law that provides
us with an important examination of the link between legal history and
broader social and cultural influences that help shape history. In a
work that is in many ways both broadly interdisciplinary and also
comparative, Grinberg helps to set the stage for an historiography of
Brazilian law that takes us into previously underappreciated corners—
corners that tell us about the cultural origins of legal doctrine and the
actual behavior of courts, jurists, and advocates. She does this with
reference to the institution—slavery—that perhaps more than any
other helped to define Brazilian society and Brazilian culture.
III. SCIENTIFIC RACISM AND EGALITARIAN CONSTITUTIONS
If slavery as an institution played a critical role in defining the
society and culture of nineteenth-century Brazil, and indeed beyond,
the generalization might be made with equal vigor concerning Cuba.138
Cuba too would experience a sugar-fueled economic boom in the
nineteenth century, fueled in part by the impact of the Haitian
Revolution on sugar and coffee plantations in Santo Domingo.139 Like
Brazil, Cuba would continue importation of African slaves well into

135. See GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 233-43.
136. Id. at 275-76.
137. See ROBERT BRENT TOPLIN, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN BRAZIL 66, 116-17,
122 (1972).
138. See LAIRD W. BERGAD ET AL., THE CUBAN SLAVE MARKET: 1790-1880, at 28
(1995).
139. Id.
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the nineteenth century.140 Cuba, like Brazil, did not abolish slavery
until the 1880s.141 Spain abolished slavery in Cuba in 1886, two years
before final abolition in Brazil in 1888.142 Alejandra Bronfman’s
Measures of Equality: Social Science Citizenship, and Race in Cuba,
1902-1940, looks at the aftermath of Cuba’s nineteenth-century history
of slavery and its derivative history of increased racial discrimination
and differentiation.143
Like Grinberg, Bronfman is, in part, examining something of a
constitutional dilemma. Cuba’s Constitution of 1901 recognized the
citizenship of all regardless of race.144 A constitution written in the
Americas at the beginning of the twentieth century could hardly do
less. Besides, Afro-Cubans had played a major role in the struggle for
independence.145 Antonio Maceo, an Afro-Cuban who became a
general in the revolutionary forces and died in the struggle to liberate
Cuba from Spain, had become a national icon.146 Still, if the law
formally recognized the equality of all, the early twentieth century in
Latin America, as indeed was also the case in the United States and
other parts of the western world, was a time when strong ideological
and scientific forces argued against doctrines of racial equality.147 In
the United States, scientific racism and social Darwinism provided an
intellectual underpinning for the willingness of the judiciary to allow
Jim Crow laws and disenfranchisement in many American states.148 In
Latin America, similar doctrines were causing intellectual and political
leaders to ponder what to do with the large, frequently a majority,
portions of their populations that were of indigenous or African
140. Cuba continued the importation of slaves until 1867, two years after the adoption
of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibited slavery.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see BERGAD ET AL., supra note 138, at 38.
141. REBECCA J. SCOTT, SLAVE EMANCIPATION IN CUBA: THE TRANSITION TO FREE
LABOR, 1860-1899, at 3 (1985).
142. Scott notes Spain’s effort to have a gradual emancipation in the 1880s. Id. at 12797.
143. See BRONFMAN, supra note 16, at 1-15. Historian George Reid Andrews notes
the increase in measures designed to restrict the rights of free Afro-Cubans in the nineteenth
century, a result that could be partially attributed to the increased African and Afro-Cuban
population and the resulting fear that free Afro-Cubans would make common cause with
slaves. See ANDREWS, supra note 36, at 69-73. As in Brazil, there were also special efforts to
curtail expressions of African culture in the fear that such could cause or promote slave
rebelliousness. See id.
144. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA DE 1901 [CUBAN REPUBLIC
CONSTITUTION OF 1901]; BRONFMAN, supra note 16, at 2-3.
145. ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE, A NATION FOR ALL: RACE, INEQUALITY, AND POLITICS
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY CUBA 12, 56-59 (2001).
146. BRONFMAN, supra note 16, at 1, 79; DE LA FUENTE, supra note 145, at 38-39.
147. BRONFMAN, supra note 16, at 4-10.
148. See COTTROL ET AL., supra note 13, at 37-39.
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descent.149 These populations were seen as an embarrassment and a
bar to national progress, i.e., the ability of a nation to join fully the
western world dominated by Europeans and white North Americans.150
Throughout the Americas the ideology of blanqueamiento, or
whitening, would develop.151 Its tenets were fairly simple: the nations
of the Americas would try to become white nations through a
combination of encouraging European immigration and encouraging
the black and brown populations to disappear through mestizaje and
by trying to define the children of mixed unions as white whenever
possible.152
The issue could be especially acute in Cuba. The island nation
had a large Afro-Cuban population and one that retained significant
African cultural practices, due in part to large scale African
immigration in the nineteenth century.153 And Cuba at the beginning
of the twentieth century was a society where U.S. influence was
strong, owing in no small part to its proximity to the United States and
the American occupation of the island between 1899 and 1902.154
Consequently, as Bronfman details, early twentieth-century Cuba
became a battleground between those who adhered to the
constitutional ideal of racial equality and those who felt that the new
scientific learning of the twentieth century dictated a subordinate, and
hopefully only temporary, place for the Afro-Cuban.155
The war between these two sides was often fought out over the
issue of expressions of African culture in Cuban life.156 For legal
historians of race relations, postemancipation Latin America has often
presented daunting challenges in trying to determine the role of law in
maintaining racial hierarchy. Unlike South Africa or the United States,
the nations of Latin America had no body of racial legislation designed
to mandate a superior status for whites and a subordinate status for
others.157 Indeed the absence of such legislation and official apartheid
or apartheid-like practices caused many observers from Latin America
149. See Cottrol, supra note 44, at 62-66 (discussing the impact of social Darwinism
on Brazilian emancipation).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 63-66 (citing WINTHROP R. WRIGHT, CAFÉ CON LECHE: RACE, CLASS, AND
NATIONAL IMAGE IN VENEZUELA 67-68 (1990)).
152. Id.
153. See ANDREWS, supra note 36, at 69-73.
154. See DE LA FUENTE, supra note 145, at 12, 56-57.
155. BRONFMAN, supra note 16, at 6-10, 28-33, 71-73.
156. Id. at 18-35.
157. Alejandro de la Fuente, Myths of Racial Democracy: Cuba, 1900-1912, LATIN
AM. RES. REV., Fall 1999, at 39, 43-49 (discussing the misperception that Brazil and Cuba
“resemble[] South Africa without apartheid”).
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and elsewhere to argue that Latin American societies were, in fact,
racial democracies, free from the kinds of discrimination that prevailed
in the United States and South Africa.158 Bronfman points to legal
efforts to stigmatize and criminalize expressions of African culture as
one way in which the presumably egalitarian law of Cuba could be put
to the service of scientific racism and blanqueamiento.159 Bronfman
tells a fascinating story of the enlistment of the new composite
discipline of criminology along with anthropology to discover
criminogenic features supposedly inherent in Afro-Cubans.160
Throughout the Americas the suppression of African cultural
expression served many purposes. It was seen as a defense of
Catholicism and civilized values.161 It also served to deemphasize the
large Afro-American element in Latin-American populations.162
Latin-American nations trying to project, for the outside world and for
themselves, an image of being essentially European could ill afford
displays of still vibrant African cultures to be too public.163 In Brazil,
legal suppression of expressions of African culture took the form of
statutes forbidding the practice of the Afro-Brazilian religious rites,
candomblé.164 Bronfman tells us of one effort to suppress African
culture: the campaign against brujo, or witchcraft, based on African
cultural traditions.165 The campaign against brujo combined many of
the elements that would define Cuban race relations in the first
decades after independence.166 The concern with brujo was part of the
obsession Cuban social scientists had with race and crime and the idea
of an inherently criminogenic quality in Afro-Cubans.167 It would lead
to hysteria, accusations of ritual murder, and lynchings.168 Here one
might have wanted a somewhat more expanded discussion on
158. In the United States, this view was most closely associated with the work of
sociologist Frank Tannenbaum. TANNENBAUM, supra note 111, at 105-06. Historian
Alejandro de la Fuente argues that, despite the fact that most modern researchers tend to
reject or disparage the racial-democracy thesis, there is still much to be said for it. See De la
Fuente, supra note 157, at 43-48. He points to, among other things, the fact that Afro-Cubans
in the early years of the twentieth century attained senior civil and military positions in the
government that would have been inconceivable in the United States at the same time. See
id.
159. BRONFMAN, supra note 16, at 6-7, 30-33.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 23-24, 34-35.
162. Id. at 22-35.
163. Id. at 38-41.
164. ANDREWS, supra note 36, at 9, 73-74, 121-22.
165. BRONFMAN, supra note 16, at 23-35.
166. Id. at 23-38.
167. Id. at 37-49.
168. Id. at 30-33.
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Bronfman’s part, perhaps more of a comparative discussion. There is
a considerable literature from the sociology of deviance on boundary
maintenance, crime waves, and hysteria that could help to frame the
discussion of the brujo hysteria in early twentieth-century Cuba.169
Similarly, the phenomenon of lynching in the U.S. South has been
examined by sociologists and historians and that literature also could
help place in context Bronfman’s study of the brujo mobilization.170
Bronfman provides a good account of the Afro-Cuban reaction to
the often hostile intellectual atmosphere that prevailed in elite
circles.171 There was a range of Afro-Cuban reactions, as might be
expected in a society where the possibility of advancement for an
individual Afro-Cuban existed if he were willing to accept certain
ideological preconditions—especially the cultural and racial inferiority
of Africans and Afro-Cubans.172 Acceptance of these premises,
coupled with the notion that the better elements of the Afro-American
population could be civilized and join the ranks of the elite, were often
the keys to upward mobility in Latin America, as we have seen with
Grinberg’s discussion of Rebouças in Brazil.173 Bronfman details how
some accepted this arrangement and also how increasingly AfroCuban intellectuals began to struggle against scientific racism and
notions of African cultural and racial inferiority.174
Bronfman’s discussion is particularly valuable as she leads us
through the role of Afro-Cuban intellectuals and political organizers
and their struggle over the Republic of Cuba Constitution of 1940
(1940 Constitution) and the effort to achieve a constitution that would
effectively guarantee equal rights under law.175 The 1940 Constitution
provided explicit provisions against discrimination based on sex, race,
color, or class.176 It also prohibited the formation of political parties or
pressure groups based on race, class, or sex.177 The provision banning
169. See, e.g., Kathleen Auerhahn, The Split Labor Market and the Origins of
Antidrug Legislation in the Unites States, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 411, 415-16 (1999) (noting
literature supporting the theory that crime waves and hysteria “arise in response to boundary
crises in society” (emphasis omitted)).
170. See, e.g., David Garland, Penal Excess and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture
Lynchings in Twentieth-Century America, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 793, 798-99, 830-32 (2005)
(providing an overview of literature discussing lynchings in the southern United States).
171. BRONFMAN, supra note 16, at 67-69.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 88-89.
174. Id. at 67-117.
175. Id. at 159-81.
176. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA DE 1940 [CUBAN REPUBLIC
CONSTITUTION OF 1940] tit. IV, art. 20.
177. Id. tit. VII, art. 102.
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racial discrimination was not self-enforcing, but empowered the
Cuban Congress to pass enforcement legislation.178
And yet, as Bronfman concludes, the nominally liberal 1940
Constitution failed in its promise to achieve racial equality, as indeed it
failed in many other ways.179 The Cuban Congress failed to pass
enforcement measures that would give teeth to the antidiscrimination
provisions of the 1940 Constitution.180 Bronfman also ends with a
telling observation that to understand how a constitution will be
applied, the student must examine not only the written provisions but
indeed the real structures of the state, “public opinion, political culture,
corruption and the use of political violence” to understand how the law
is actually going to be applied.181 It might be added that this was
particularly true of the provision outlawing racial discrimination.182
The article specifically required legislative enforcement, invariably
throwing the rights of Afro-Cubans and other racial minorities back
into the political process where skill and the formation of alliances
would play a major part in determining whether the normative
prescriptions of the 1940 Constitution would ever find effective
enforcement.183
IV. NORMATIVE NOMINALISM, GOOD INTENTION, INDIFFERENT
RESULTS, AND BRAZILIAN LABOR LAW
It is the question of the gap between legal norms and effective
enforcement that engages John D. French in Drowning in Laws:
Labor Law and Brazilian Political Culture.184 French, a historian who
has written extensively on Brazilian labor history, focuses his attention
on Brazil’s Consolidação das leis do trabalho, or Consolidated Labor
Code (CLT).185 The CLT was enacted in 1943 by the administration of
populist dictator Getulio Vargas.186 It has remained the foundation of
Brazilian labor law down to the present.187
178. BRONFMAN, supra note 16, at 180.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 180, 184.
181. Id. at 180 (citing Nicolas Graizeau, Genèse, exégèse et pratique de la
Constitution de 1960, in CUBA SOUS LE REGIME DE LA CONSTITUTION DE 1940: POLITIQUE,
PENSEE CRITIQUE, LITTERATURE (James Cohen & Francoise Moulin Civil eds., 1997)).
182. Id. at 174.
183. Id. at 179.
184. See, e.g., JOHN D. FRENCH, THE BRAZILIAN WORKERS’ ABC: CLASS CONFLICT
AND ALLIANCES IN MODERN SÃO PAOLO 4-16 (1992).
185. FRENCH, supra note 17, at 1; see Decreto-lei No. 5.452, de 1 de maio de 1943,
D.O.U. de 09.08.1943 (Braz.).
186. See Decreto-lei No. 5.452, D.O.U. de 09.08.1943; FRENCH, supra note 17, at 1.
187. See FRENCH, supra note 17, at 3-4.
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By its stated terms, the CLT was visionary, arguably the most
advanced and protective labor legislation of the time.188 The Vargas
government, proud of its work and seeing the law as a model for other
nations, had the code translated into English for international
consumption.189 Among other provisions, it protects the right to form
labor organizations, prescribes conditions of employment and work,
outlines procedures for the resolution of employment disputes, sets
maximum hours and minimum salaries, sets limits on the discharge of
employees, and provides regulations protecting the health and safety
of workers, including special provisions for women and minors.190 As
French notes:
One is immediately struck by the extraordinary liberality with which
the CLT accords rights and guarantees to urban working people and
their organizations. If the universe of work did in fact operate
according to the CLT, Brazil would be the world’s best place to work.
And if even half of the CLT was enforced, Brazil would be one of the
more decent and reasonably humane places for those who work.191

But it is the failure of the CLT, its history of nonapplication and
inadequate protection for Brazilian workers, that is French’s focus in
Drowning in Laws.192 Key provisions of the CLT were routinely
violated.193 Employers did so openly, often with the connivance of
sympathetic government officials.194 Corruption was rampant among
government inspectors charged with enforcing safety and other
provisions protecting industrial workers.195 Labor courts also proved
inadequate to the task of protecting Brazilian workers.196 Even when
188. Id. at 1.
189. Id. at 41.
190. Decreto-lei No. 5.452, D.O.U. de 09.08.1943; FRENCH, supra note 17, at 40-41;
see Roberto Fragale Filho, Employment Litigation on the Rise? A Brazilian Perspective, 22
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 281, 288 (2001). Filho is a Brazilian legal scholar and labor judge
who has noted that the CLT provides full protection against dismissal without cause for an
employee with at least ten years of service. Decreto-lei No. 5.452, D.O.U. de 09.08.1943;
Filho, supra, at 288. An employee in that category can only be dismissed for significant
cause as determined by judicial procedure. Decreto-lei No. 5.452, D.O.U. de 09.08.1943;
Filho, supra, at 288. Employees with less than ten years of service are entitled to
indemnification of one month’s pay for each year of service before dismissal. Decreto-lei
No. 5.452, D.O.U. de 09.08.1943; Filho, supra, at 288.
191. FRENCH, supra note 17, at 41.
192. Id. at 42-46.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 42-46.
196. Id. at 49-53; see Stanley A. Gacek, Revisiting the Corporalist and Contractulist
Models of Labor Law Regimes: A Review of the Brazilian and American Systems, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 69-70 (1994) (noting that Brazilian labor courts have been less
concerned with the protection of worker’s rights).
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they had strong cases or actually prevailed in court against employers,
the prospect of delay in appellate litigation forced claimants to settle
for a fraction of what they were owed.197
French traces the enforcement or failure to enforce the CLT
through the different governments of postwar Brazil.198 The CLT
remained an underenforced legal norm through a succession of
governments, democratic and military, right and left.199 Particularly
telling is French’s discussion of how even during the early 1960s
under leftist labor-supportive Presidents Jãnio Quadros and João
Goulart, Brazil’s labor courts proved inadequate to the task of CLT.200
How does one account for the failure of Brazilian law in so
critical an area? French takes us through several model explanations,
pointing out their flaws and inadequacies. North American scholars in
the 1960s sought to explain labor relations within the context of Latin
corporatism, i.e., a dependence on a strong state and state intervention
in labor affairs to mediate working conditions.201 In a sense, this
corporate model was an extension of the kind of paternalistic and
hierarchical social relations that traditionally had prevailed in Latin
societies with the state taking the place of the traditional patron as
paternalistic protector.202 Under this model, labor protection remained
weak because it was not the result of organizing and bargaining on the
part of workers, but instead was an extension of traditional clientism
with workers still dependent on others for protection.203 French
dismisses this explanation at its simplest, not only for its
ethnocentricity, but also for its assumption that past cultural patterns
would have such a profound effect on present behavior patterns.204 I
will return to this point a bit later.
French also rightly sees as too facile simplistic Marxist
explanations that the CLT was fraudulent from the start, i.e., an attempt
by the quasi-Fascist Vargas regime to impose the CLT on a reluctant
industrial proletariat in order to preclude more radical, working class
organization.205 French dismisses this view, as he had done in his
earlier work.206 If the CLT was in part designed to forestall a certain
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

FRENCH, supra note 17, at 42-46.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 60-72.
Id. at 49-53; see Gacek, supra note 196, at 69-70.
FRENCH, supra note 17, at 56-59.
Id.
Id. at 58-60.
Id. at 56-60.
Id.
See FRENCH, supra note 184, at 4-16.
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degree of working-class militancy, it nonetheless, as French notes, was
also meant to provide a measure of labor protection, and it also left a
political and social space for labor organizing that might otherwise
have been absent.207
French sees a bit more promise in looking at the legal culture in
Brazil as an explanation for the gap between reality and performance
in the field of labor law.208 Students of Brazilian law and culture have
long noted the conflict between the idealism and reality in Brazilian
law.209 That tension was inherent from the beginning with the drafting
of the 1824 Constitution containing strongly egalitarian and libertarian
language masking its protection of slaveholding.210 That duality would
continue in 1830 when Brazil signed a treaty outlawing the slave
trade.211 It was a legal restriction Brazil’s elites had no intention of
following: they scornfully termed the treaty as something “for the
English to see,” a device to placate the British committed to ending the
African slave trade.212
But it would be a mistake to too quickly attribute the Brazilian
gap between stated law and the law as actually applied as simply the
result of self-conscious deception or of cynical manipulation of the
legal system to benefit ruling elites. These factors are at work, at times
to be sure, but something more contributes to the failure of the
Brazilian legal system to deliver on the promise of an effective legal
regime. That something more extends beyond the discussion of law
and the rights of workers outlined in French’s study. A 1971 article by
North American legal scholar Keith Rosenn points us, at least part of
the way, toward an understanding of Brazilian legal culture and how
that culture regularly produces wide gaps between the stated and
actual law.213 And although Rosenn’s article is steeped in the kind of
culturalist explanation that French cautions us about, it does provide a
useful historical and cultural context against which to understand
Brazilian law and Brazil’s legal community.214 Rosenn’s explanation
that the concept of jeito, roughly translated as knack or skill, is often
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

FRENCH, supra note 17, at 59.
Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 5-6.
DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 60-61.
FRENCH, supra note 17, at 97-121; see LESLIE BETHELL, THE ABOLITION OF THE
BRAZILIAN SLAVE TRADE 88-95 (1970) (discussing the Additional Convention to the Treaty
Between Great Britain and Portugal for the Purpose of Preventing Their Subjects from
Engaging in Any Illicit Traffic in Slaves, July 8, 1817, available at
http://www.pdavis.ne/Treaty_Portugal.htm).
212. DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 60-61.
213. Rosenn, supra note 14, at 515.
214. Id. (discussing the importance of jeito in Brazilian legal culture).
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key to understanding how Brazilians understand the purpose of law
and indeed how the law will actually work out.215 For Rosenn and
others who have emphasized cultural explanations and Brazil’s legacy
of paternalistic social relations, the multiplicity of legal sources that
existed both during Brazil’s period as a colony of Portugal and during
the nineteenth-century empire all contributed to a culture where the
rule of law, at least as officially intended and stated, was weak—where
one’s expectations of achieving satisfaction in the nation’s courts or
from officials who staffed administrative agencies were frequently
unfulfilled.216
And yet a cultural explanation such as the one proffered by
Rosenn invites questions. If social relations in parts of Brazil still bear
the marks of the nation’s seigneurial past, there are parts of the nation
for which, at least on the surface, this is decidedly not the case. Brazil
is the eighth-largest industrial economy in the world.217 Much of that
economy is centered in São Paulo, a gigantic industrial megalopolis,
and a large percentage of São Paulo’s population is descended from
twentieth-century immigrants.218 Why, as French has shown in both
Drowning in Laws and The Brazilian Workers’ ABC, haven’t modern
labor relations and a more modern approach to labor law taken over in
the more industrialized regions, regions less heir to the paternalistic
past of the colony and empire?
As was the case with Grinberg in O fiador dos brasileiros,
French realizes the importance of the legal profession as an
autonomous subculture, setting to an extent its own rules and

215. Rosenn notes the term jeito is used to cover a wide range of behavior from outand-out corruption on the part of public officials to creative behavior on the part of
governmental officials seeking to get around rules that are either outmoded or that should not
be applied in a specific case. Id. at 515-16 (outlining several applications of the term juste).
Rosenn began his article with an illustration of jeito, which he notes has no precise
counterpart in the English language:
A perceptive satirical study of the Brazilian way of life relates a European
immigrant’s first contact with Brazilian administrative practice. During his visa
appointment with the Brazilian consul in Paris, the would-be immigrant was asked
his profession. He replied that he had recently graduated from medical school. The
consul responded, “Then in place of doctor, let’s put down agronomist. In that way
I can issue you a visa immediately. You know how these things are . . . . In any
event, this way will make it perfectly legal.”
Id. at 514 (footnote omitted).
216. Id. at 526-37.
217. Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM.
J. COMP. L. 311, 315 (2003) (comparing Brazilian and U.S. societies).
218. See Charles W. Cookson II, Long-Term Direct Investment in Brazil, 35 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 345, 348 (2004) (discussing the immigrant population in São Paulo).
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developing its own system of values.219 This too would affect the
behavior of law in Brazil in both direct and indirect ways. This is true
in the most obvious way—Brazilian lawyers, whether they are
practicing attorneys, academics, jurists, or legislators are part of a
wider world of people trained in law and in universities more
generally.220 They historically have been part of the bacharel class.221
That class in Brazil has been responsible for legal reforms—often
doing so because they were influenced by liberal thought in the
western world of which they were a part and often because they
wanted to ensure the acceptability of Brazil in the eyes of their peers in
Europe and the Americas.222 The 1824 Constitution, for example,
clearly reflected the influence of the French Enlightenment.223 French
antislavery thought and the example of American abolition fueled
growing antislavery sentiment in this class and their ultimate support
for the 1871 “Law of the Free Womb” and final abolition in 1888.224
The roots of the CLT were influenced less by liberal ideology than by
the corporatism of Benito Mussolini after whose regime Getulio
Vargas modeled much of his Estado Novo.225 But even then the Vargas
government translated the code into English, probably in part to
impress the government of his wartime ally, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.226 In the postwar period Brazil would pass national civil
219. FRENCH, supra note 17, at 70-72.
220. Id. at 60-64.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 59-60.
224. Id. at 163-66.
225. Ricardo Silva Seitenfus, Ideology and Diplomacy: Italian Fascism and Brazil
(1935-38), 64 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 503, 525-26 (1984) (indicating the influence of Fascist
legislation on the Brazilian Estado Novo).
226. FRENCH, supra note 17, at 41. Despite the fascist influence on Vargas’ political
thinking, Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy in the summer of 1942 after German Uboats sank a number of Brazilian merchant ships in the South Atlantic. The Brazilian Armed
Forces took an active role in the war against the Axis; some 25,000 Brazilian troops took part
in the Italian campaign. The Brazilian army maintains a Web site detailing the history of the
Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB). See EXÉRCITO BRASILEIRO, FORÇA EXPEDICIONÁRIA
BRASILEIRA (FEB), A FEB NA II GUERRA MUNDIAL, http://www.exercito.gov.br/03Brafor/
feb/meiramat.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2007); EXÉRCITO BRASILEIRO, FORÇA
EXPEDICIONÁRIA
BRASILEIRA
(FEB),
JORNAL
DA
GUERRA,
http://www.exercito.gov.br/03Brafor/feb/octavio.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2007). Vargas’
social legislation was lauded in the short (nine minute) U.S. War Department propaganda
film, Brazil at War. BRAZIL AT WAR (Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
1943). The film depicted Brazil as a nation where constitutional rights were respected and
the population was protected by progressive social legislation including, presumably, the
CLT. For one discussion of the FEB and its impact on postwar politics in Brazil, see Shawn
C. Smallman, The Official Story: The Violent Censorship of Brazilian Veterans, 1945-1954,
78 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 229 (1998).

30

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1

rights legislation, Lei Afonso Arinos, in part to make a statement that
the nation was in fact the racial democracy that it claimed to be.227
But if the separate culture that was the legal community helped
develop legal reforms and laws that made the outside world aware of
Brazilian policies and Brazilian values, they also had internal norms
and practices that sometimes thwarted the very reforms they were
trying to implement.228 Brazilian lawyers and jurists have helped to
develop a very inefficient legal system.229 Whether it can be
explained, as Rosenn attempted, as a holdover from the Portuguese
colonial system and the nineteenth-century empire of Dom Pedro I and
Dom Pedro II, or whether some other explanation should be sought,
the inefficiencies of the system are real.230 These inefficiencies play an
important role in thwarting the stated aims of the written law,
perpetuating a system where personalistic ties and jeito often play as
great or greater a role in determining how, or indeed if, conflicts are
resolved.231 If we take but two examples: (1) Brazilian courts have
historically not recognized stare decisis as a limitation on judicial
decision making,232 and (2) the 1988 Constitution gives broad standing
to potential litigants.233 The lack of stare decisis is common in civil
law systems where the text of the code or constitutional provision, and
not prior decisions, are supposed to be governing law.234 Broad
standing is seen as part of a commitment to keep the courts open to all,
a value that has been seen as particularly important since the return to
democratic rule in the 1980s.235

227. Lei No. 1.390, de 3 de julho de 1951, D.O.U. de 10.7.1951 (Braz.); Cottrol, supra
note 7, at 120-21 (analyzing the disconnect between Brazilian law promoting racial harmony
and actual practice); Tanya Katerí Hernández, To Be Brown in Brazil: Education and
Segregation Latin American Style, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 683, 694 (2005)
(highlighting the Brazilian “myth of racial democracy” through its cultural practice of public
segregation).
228. Rosenn, supra note 14, at 543-46 (discussing the costs associated with Brazil’s
legal structure).
229. Id. at 526-34 (analyzing the legal culture of Brazil).
230. Id. at 517-19 (tracing the roots of Brazil’s legal structure to Portuguese
colonialism).
231. Id. at 515, 523 (emphasizing the importance of jeito and personal ties in Brazilian
legal culture).
232. See Megan J. Ballard, The Clash Between Local Courts and Global Economics:
The Politics of Judicial Reform in Brazil, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 230, 258-59 (1999).
233. Id. at 247-48 (explaining the expanded rights and reforms of the 1988
Constitution); see Constituição Federal [C.F.] (Braz.).
234. Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A
Comparative and Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation, 65 LA. L.
REV. 775, 779, 787 (2005).
235. Ballard, supra note 232, at 244-48.
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And yet both the absence of stare decisis and liberal standing, or
broad access to the courts, has helped produce a judicial system often
simply incapable of handling the sheer volume of cases that come
before it.
Roberto Fragale Filho’s examination of Brazilian
employment litigation illustrates this. His article discusses both the
open access Brazilian workers had to the labor courts in the 1990s and
the large amount of employment litigation; nearly 2.5 million cases
came before the labor courts toward the end of that decade (in the year
1997).236 The problem is seen most acutely in the caseload and
function of Brazil’s Supremo Tribunal Federal, the nation’s highest
court.237 Because of the absence of both certiorari and stare decisis,
the Brazilian high court receives and must decide over 100,000 cases
per year, often producing huge backlogs.238 Decisions made by the
court become, of course, the law of the case, but end up having value
only as persuasive precedent, one of many sources of law.239 The legal
issues raised and decided in a prior case can be revisited again by the
lower courts.240
Efforts to make the system more efficient have frequently been
resisted by the Brazilian bar.241 At least part of the task of studying the
gap between the law as stated and the law as actually applied in Brazil,
and indeed other legal cultures, involves examining the interplay
between cultures, institutions, and the law. If Brazilian lawyers are
part of an educated class that reflect and try to implement international
norms on workers’ rights, protection of minorities and women, and
safeguarding the environment, among other areas, they are also part of
an internal Brazilian legal culture committed to continuing traditional
practices. It would be surprising if this were not the case. The legal
profession in every society takes great pains to socialize new members
into existing norms and practices. It does so both through formal
education in law schools as well as informal apprenticeships where
newly minted law school graduates are turned into practicing
attorneys. People become familiar with and try to maintain those
practices and structures with which they are not only familiar, but
within which they indeed have been successful.

236. Filho, supra note 190, at 282.
237. Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira, Reforming the Brazilian Supreme
Federal Court: A Comparative Approach, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 99, 100-13
(2006) (reviewing the heavy caseload of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court).
238. Id. at 100.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Cf. id. at 141.
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All of which adds to the complexity of analyzing why and how
the law gets implemented in different societies. The juncture of often
clashing societal interests that law is meant to mediate is often joined
by a fragmented legal culture, lawyers representing different factions
and interests combined with frequently conflicting internal demands
from within the legal system. In Brazil, and indeed other parts of Latin
America, this combination has helped to produce a kind of normative
nominalism where egalitarian norms have become enshrined in
constitutions and statutes but have proven elusive in application. Keila
Grinberg, Alejandra Bronfman, and John D. French have all pointed us
toward a better understanding of the complexities of the law’s
formation and application in Latin America and by doing so have
pointed us toward a richer and more textured legal history of the
region.

